The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan by Akhavan-Majid, Roya
St. Cloud State University
theRepository at St. Cloud State
Mass Communication Faculty Publications Department of Mass Communications
12-1990
The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan
Roya Akhavan-Majid
St. Cloud State University, rakhavan@stcloudstate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/comm_facpubs
Part of the Mass Communication Commons
This Peer Reviewed Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Mass Communications at theRepository at St. Cloud State.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mass Communication Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of theRepository at St. Cloud State. For
more information, please contact rswexelbaum@stcloudstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Akhavan-Majid, Roya, "The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan" (1990). Mass Communication Faculty Publications. 3.
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/comm_facpubs/3
The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan 
 
by Roya Akhavan-Majid 
 
A lengthy field study in Japan using interviews and other sources and focusing 
on the nation's five leading national newspapers and Tokyo's major television 
stations finds evidence of much overlap between industry and the news media, 
through interlocking directorships and social club memberships, for example. 
Also journalists and other industrial leaders tend to be educated at the same 
exclusive universities and journalists also belong to professional clubs in which 
common values are shared. There already is a concentration of ownership of 
Japanese mass media and, through the mean sketched in this study, one can find 
how the mass media are integrated with other power centers of Japanese society. 
 
Despite the growing importance of Japan on the international scene, the last five 
decades have seen few analytical investigations of the postwar mass media in Japan. To 
the extent that they do exist, studies of the Japanese mass media characterize the system 
as essentially Libertarian, albeit one that tends to deviate, more so than its western 
counterparts, from the Libertarian ideal-type. It is the contention of this paper, however, 
that far from representing minor deviations, these anomalies reflect inherent structural 
differences with the Libertarian model, calling for an altogether different 
conceptualization. 
The key characteristics of the alternative model exemplified by the Japanese mass 
media system include 1) concentration of ownership (as opposed to diversity and 
plurality of media units), 2) integration with other elite power groups (as opposed to 
independence from the power elite), and 3) two-way flow of influence and control 
between the government and the press (as opposed to freedom of the press from 
government control). In the context of this model, the press — by virtue of the power 
accrued from its concentration and integration into the elite power structure — is viewed 
as an "elite power group" able to exercise reverse control on the ruling elite, even as it is 
controlled by it. This reverse control, furthermore, is exercised not through theoretical 
influence on public opinion, a diffuse influence which may or may not translate into 
government policy, but through direct participation in government policy-making 
structures and process. Motivated by its own interests, the media elite is then likely to 
influence government policy in the direction of further concentration and conglomeration 
(i.e., economic integration with big business), thus reinforcing the three major 
components of the model in a positive feed-back loop. 
Although certain aspects of the first two of the abovementioned characteristics 
have been studied in the past with respect to a variety of mass media systems, few studies 
have addressed the third characteristic, namely the media's ability to exercise reverse 
influence on government policy directly and in the direction of its own interests.1 These 
characteristics, furthermore, have never been viewed as components of a single press 
structure and considered together as a coherent, theoretically interrelated set of 
characteristics making up an alternative press model. 
Against this backdrop the purpose of this study is to provide a framework for 
understanding the Japanese mass media system, while also elucidating the components of 
an alternative press model which could potentially provide a basis for the study and 
reexamination of other press systems, including that in the United States. In so doing, this 
study will focus on an analysis of the Japanese mass media system in terms of the 
specific characteristics of the model delineated above. 
 
Concentration of Ownership 
The highly concentrated nature of the mass media in Japan is one of the major 
characteristics contributing to the media's collective power over the other traditionally 
recognized Japanese elite power groups.2 
Media ownership in Japan is concentrated primarily in the hands of five major 
mass media conglomerates which own newspaper and broadcasting enterprises all over 
Japan. The five major national newspapers, Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, and Sankei, 
with nationwide circulations of up to 13 million copies per day, are tied in cross-media 
ownership to Tokyo's five key television stations NTV, TV Asahi, TBS, TV Tokyo and 
Fuji TV respectively.3 
The extensive cross-media ownership exists despite regulations which state that 
the level of investment by a newspaper enterprise in a television station can not exceed 
10% of the station's share.4 Using a variety of means, including investments through 
"sister companies," however, the actual level of investment by each newspaper enterprise 
in its affiliated TV station exceeds 50%.5 Despite regulations barring the key stations to 
form network relationships with the local stations, furthermore, the key stations do in fact 
function as networks, providing the local stations with more than 80% of their 
programming.6 
Again, despite regulations limiting the level of interlocking directorship between 
the affiliated newspapers and televisions stations, each of the five newspaper-television 
conglomerates is, in effect, controlled by the same person who often simultaneously 
holds the chairmanship of the key station and the presidency of the newspaper 
enterprise.7 
In addition to the five national newspapers and broadcasting networks, media 
ownership in these five media conglomerates also extends to magazines, sports tabloids, 
and local newspaper and television stations.8 
The overwhelming prominence of these media conglomerates on the national 
scene implies strong potential power in exerting control on the flow of information. The 
executives and managing editors of these conglomerates hold the power to cover up or 
reveal any political scandal or to campaign for or against any interest. In this respect, the 
senior members of these media conglomerates constitute a major power group in 
Japanese society. 
 Integration with other Elite Power Croups 
Mass media elite integration in Japan is based on the three primary components of 
shared academic elite membership, personnel flow and overlap, and economic 
interlocking.  
In addition to being privileged members of sprawling conglomerates dominating 
the channels of communication in Japan, Japanese media professionals are also members 
of an academic elite. Without exception, all Japanese journalists entering any of the five 
major national dailies are recruited through a three-stage process of written and oral 
competition with rates of success as low as one per 150 participants.9 Almost all recruits 
are new college graduates and come from such top prestige universities as Tokyo, Kyoto, 
Waseda and Keio. In this way, they are members of the same "university clubs" to which 
most powerful elite groups belong. 
Within the context of Japan's highly competitive educational system, having been 
able to enter and graduate from these top three universities confers an elite status on the 
individual unlike any other in Japanese society. It is a distinction which not only opens 
the door to top positions in Japanese elite institutions, but remains a strong component of 
the individual's personal identity, group identification, and public image throughout his 
life. 
The academic elite status held by the majority of mass media practitioners in 
Japan, thus constitutes the first component of mass media integration into the elite power 
structure. 
Another component of mass media-elite integration in Japan is the interlocking 
between the media conglomerates and the Japanese bureaucracy, arising from the regular 
flow of high-level bureaucrats from such related ministries as the ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), into top executive positions in the media industry. This flow 
is part of a larger pattern of personnel flow and overlap between various elite power 
groups in Japan, the most conspicuous of which is the institutionalized practice of 
"amakudari" or "descent from heaven" on the basis of which, every year, Japan's retiring 
top-level bureaucrats take up executive positions in industries previously under their 
jurisdiction.10 
A third component of mass media-elite integration exists at the economic level 
between the five media conglomerates and Japanese big business, based upon the 
extensive investments made by big business in the broadcasting industry. Japan's five 
media conglomerates are, in effect, joint ventures between big business and the mass 
media industry. The financial interlocking between the two power groups, furthermore, 
has increased substantially since the advent of new media technologies as Japanese big 
business has joined the media conglomerates in dominating ownership patterns in such 
new media as teletext,11 cable television, and direct broadcast satellites (DBS). 
In the case of teletext, the mass media-big business interlocking has come to 
include NHK, the country's public service broadcaster. Since 1985, NHK has been a 
major shareholder in two commercial teletext companies (Japan Teletext and Kinki 
Teletext) established under NHK-big business ownership.12 Japan's third commercial 
teletext broadcasting company (Telemo Japan), is a joint venture between big business 
and the five media conglomerates.13 
Cable TV ownership patterns in Japan reflect a similar interlocking between the 
country's major businesses and mass media conglomerates. Although cable television as a 
means of program origination has yet to take off in Japan, in terms of ownership it is 
dominated by a giant mass media-big business joint venture. Formed in June 1986, the 
joint stock company was itself the result of a mega merger between six cable TV 
companies established a few years earlier under big business-mass media ownership.14 
Japan's first commercial DBS is also planned as a mass media-big business joint 
venture. Of the three DBS channels to be carried by Japan's first operational direct 
broadcast satellite (BS3) after it's launch in 1991, one is planned as a commercial channel 
to be operated by Japan Satellite Co., a joint venture between Japan's most prominent 
businesses and the five mass media conglomerates.15 
The mass media in Japan, therefore, are characterized not only by a high level of 
concentration in ownership, but also by a growing integration and interlocking with the 
Japanese big business. 
Indeed, it may be argued that, in the absence of enforced anti-trust and 
concentration of ownership regulations, conglomeration as a means of market domination 
represents a logical and natural business response to the threat of competition. 
Accordingly faced with the threat of competition from the new information technologies, 
the existing vested mass media interests in Japan have coalesced with major Japanese 
businesses in their efforts to dominate the new media markets; a move which allows them 
to not only raise the necessary capital, but also to share the risks of entering what is likely 
to be a potentially lucrative but as yet uncertain market. As we will see, the media's 
ability to evade existing ownership regulations, and to successfully lobby for their 
gradual elimination through the exercise of direct influence on Japanese media policy, 
has been a concomitant part of this process, lending positive reinforcement in turn to the 
circular process of concentration of ownership, economic interlocking with big business, 
and growing influence on government policy. 
 
Two Way Flow of Control between the Government and the Press 
One of the major characteristics of the Japanese press as an elite power group is its 
ability to exert reverse influence on the government in the direction of its own interests. 
Before going on to discuss this process of reverse control, however, let us explore the 
nature of the government control of the press in Japan. 
Government Control of the Press. The first element of government influence on 
the press in Japan is its subtle control on the newsgathering process. The journalist's 
access to news and information in Japan is constrained through a variety of factors. In 
order to be able to gather information, Japanese journalists need to be members of bona 
fide news organizations. Such a membership, in turn, entitles the journalist to join the 
appropriate reporter clubs "kisha kurabu" which function as the primary conduits of 
official information. 
Every major public, governmental, or private organization has its own reporter 
club and provides lounges, desks, and work space for reporters specifically assigned to 
cover its activities.16 These Kisha clubs, therefore, function as almost exclusive channels 
of information regarding the pertinent institutions and it is within the confines of the club 
walls that much of the reporter/official interaction takes place. In addition to restricting 
free individual access to news sources, the collective and exclusive nature of Kisha club 
news-gathering in Japan is responsible for a striking uniformity in news coverage among 
various media organizations. 
The Japanese reporters' ability to gather information is further constrained by the 
fact that officials in Japan are not legally bound to disclose information. Several laws in 
Japan restrict the disclosure of various types of information by government employees, 
while there exists no law to safeguard the reporters' access to official information.17 
Within the context of Japan's legal literature, the "freedom of newsgathering" is cited as a 
principle deserving of respect. Unlike the freedom of expression, however, it is not 
guaranteed.18 
The subtle restrictions and controls placed on the process of newsgathering in 
Japan thus translate into the need for media professionals to attract the cooperation and 
friendship of the bureaucratic/political elite so as to be able to perform their journalistic 
function. This, in turn, has encouraged the routine practice by news organizations of 
assigning each of their political reporters to a specific politician or high level bureaucrat. 
Often, this is a lifetime commitment, tying the fortunes of the journalist to those of the 
official assigned to him. The personal ties thus formed between the reporters and their 
sources can sometimes be so strong as to create "factional" struggles within news 
organizations, mirroring those within the party and the bureaucracy.19 
These structural and organizational characteristics enable the officials in Japan to 
exercise direct as well as indirect control over the news media. Unlike the censorship 
exercised in the so-called "authoritarian" countries, however, press control in Japan is 
based not on coercion, but on subtle restrictions on news-gathering which lead to 
functional dependence on the part of media professional on the friendship and favor of 
government officials. 
 
Press Control of the Government. The government's control of the mass media in Japan, 
however, is not complete. And, inasmuch as the Japanese bureaucratic and political elite 
have come to rely on the press for favorable explanation of their actions and policies, to 
that extent has the press in Japan been able to develop its own power and gain 
considerable control over the government elite. The Japanese press exercises this power 
by selectively concealing or revealing damaging political facts. The highly concentrated 
nature of mass media in Japan, enabling each media conglomerate to reach millions of 
people on a national scale, represents a major element of the Japanese media's power in 
this respect. With widely read national newspapers as well as well-placed friends in the 
national government readily at its disposal, each media conglomerate in Japan has the 
potential power to influence extensively, if not make or break, the career of any given 
member of the bureaucratic/political elite. 
The subsequent need on the part of the government elite to ensure good relations 
with the press in Japan has, among other things, led to routine efforts on the part of the 
government officials to solicit and accommodate the interests of the mass media 
conglomerates in all matters of media policy. Throughout the 198O's, during which much 
of Japan's new media policy has been formulated, the media conglomerates have been 
represented on all relevant "policy advisory committees"—which constitute the primary 
structures of policy-making in Japan20— and have wielded visible influence on the policy 
outcomes. 
In the case of teletext, for example, the media conglomerates have been able, 
through their direct participation in the policy-making structures, to score major victories 
with respect to deregulation of ownership, allowing them to preempt competition and 
dominate ownership patterns in the new medium. 
Since early in teletext's development, Japan's media conglomerates had shown 
great concern in relation to the possible threat that the new medium might pose to their 
newspaper publishing and broadcasting interests and asserted their right to dominate 
teletext broadcasting in Japan. In so doing the media conglomerates lobbied for  
1) total elimination of the existing cross-media ownership regulations, allowing the 
media conglomerates to obtain majority shares in the new medium, and 
2) categorization of teletext as electronically transmitted "text"; and subsequent 
removal of all content regulations including the "fairness and balance" 
requirements normally applied to broadcasting on the basis of the Broadcast law.21 
 
While, in view of its interest in regulating the new medium, MPT, Japan's primary 
telecommunications and broadcasting authority, remained unfavorable to the media 
conglomerates’ insistence on teletext's classification as a "print" medium, in November 
1985, it agreed to relax the cross-media ownership limits, allowing each media 
conglomerate to hold up to a 30% share in teletext businesses.22 This raised the previous 
level of permissible investment by 20%. Responding further to the media conglomerate's 
demands, MIT exempted teletext broadcasters from the educational and public service 
programming requirements contained in the Broadcast Law. 
Faced with continuing pressure from the Japan Publishers and Editors Association 
(NSK) and the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters, MPT revised its 
"teletext broadcasting licensing policy" once again in October 1987, removing all 
restrictions on ownership and control of teletext broadcasting by the media 
conglomerates. The decision, reached by MPT under organized mass media pressure, was 
hailed by NSK as "a milestone in pushing forward deregulation.23 
Cable television policy in Japan provides another example of direct mass media 
influence on government policy. Although as a means of signal enhancement and 
retransmission, cable has existed in Japan since 1955, it has yet to take off as a means of 
program origination.24 Although factors such as the relative abundance of television 
channels and the lack of sufficient program production capacity have been partially 
responsible for this slow growth, the long-standing opposition by the media 
conglomerates to any program origination CATV ventures has played a major part in 
determining the nature and pace of cable TV development in Japan. 
The first program origination venture in Japan, launched in 1968 by a company called 
NCV, was strongly opposed by a coalition of Japan's mass media conglomerates and the 
country's public broadcaster, NHK.25 Seeking to respond to the strong protest on the part 
of the mass media elite, yet lacking any legal grounds to block the venture, MPT asked 
NCV to allow the existing broadcasters to join it as partners in the proposed cable TV 
company, leading to a forced coalition among adversarial interests which brought an 
effective halt to the venture.26 
Adopted in 1972, not long after the NCV episode, Japan's Cable Broadcast Law also 
strongly favors the media conglomerates, enabling the existing broadcasters to exercise 
direct veto power over the fate of any newcomers into the business. The law, for 
example, requires new cable operators to get retransmission consent from the existing 
broadcasters.27 Because better reception of the over the air channels remains an important 
incentive for cable subscription in Japan, the inability to provide such a service could 
seriously affect prospect for any new cablecasting enterprise. 
The interests of the existing broadcasters are further served by the fact that from the 
beginning no limits were imposed on cable ownership by either the Cable Broadcast Law 
or the MPT regulations.28 As a result, the current cable television ownership patterns in 
Japan are dominated by a handful of mass media-big business consortia which 
collectively control the pace and extent of cable development in Japan. 
Even in the case of DBS development which, aside from its implications for the 
broadcasting industry, is directly tied with the larger objectives of Japan's space program, 
the interests of the media conglomerates have been in the forefront as a major policy 
criterion. Although the general opposition by Japans mass media to commercial DBS 
development has thus far failed to change MPT's plans to devote one of the three 
channels on Japan's first operational DBS (BS3) to commercial broadcasting, the media 
conglomerates have succeeded in preserving their interest on several grounds. First, in 
addition to their 35% share (which includes the 19% share held by the commercial 
broadcasters and the 16% share held by the five major newspapers), the media 
conglomerates hold the marketing and programming rights in the commercial DBS 
company, giving them effective control over the channel and the pace of its 
development.29 Second, based upon the conglomerates' lobbying against the use of 
advertising in DBS, a subscription system is currently being considered as the primary 
means of financing for the proposed commercial channel.30 
Although a basic conflict of interest between NHK and the media conglomerates,31 
arising from NHK's disproportionately larger share of the channels on the proposed BS3 
satellite, remains a major obstacle in the path of DBS development in Japan, extensive 
efforts by MPT continue in the context of various advisory committees to resolve the 
conflict— a fact which attests further to the powerful role played by the mass media in 
shaping Japan's new media policy. Given the level of influence exercised by the media 
conglomerates on all matters of media policy in Japan, the ultimate resolution of the 
ongoing conflict between the two groups remains a major prerequisite to the successful 
implementation of Japan’s DBS program. 
 
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
Based upon such characteristics as concentration of ownership, integration with 
other elite power groups, and subsequent ability to exercise direct influence on 
government policy, the mass media in Japan represent a major elite power group in, 
Japanese society. Far from representing a unique case, however, the alternative model 
exemplified by the Japanese mass media may be considered to provide a framework for 
the study and reexamination of other press systems currently subsumed under the 
Libertarian theory. Such reexamination would be particularly relevant in the case of the 
United States, in which a growing concentration and conglomeration in media ownership, 
and a major media deregulatory trend fueled by extensive lobbying on the part of vested 
media interests has long been in evidence. A comprehensive reexamination of the 
existing Libertarian systems may lead to the conclusion that the Libertarian model of the 
press is being gradually replaced by an Elite Power Group model. 
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